Kenya: It’s time to stop demonising Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) (opinion)

The East African (Kenya) , by Paul Goldsmith* -December 3, 2012

Nairobi (Kenya) - I conducted research on the Mombasa Republican Council last year and have continued to follow the issues, events and actors after submitting my final report. Like the court that tried and acquitted 20 defendants charged in the Mulungu Nipa forest case, I found no evidence of significant MRC armed activity.

Kenya’s High Court came to the same conclusion when they lifted the ban on the MRC in June. Since that time, security spokesmen have repeatedly stated that the MRC is behind a series of attacks. But the state arrested a number of MRC leaders and supporters on charges of incitement, and not for the alleged attacks — while a local magistrate in effect overruled the High Court by re-criminalising the organisation. These developments, and the arrest of the Mombasa MP Mohammed Dor Mohammed for speaking out on behalf of the MRC, effectively silenced the Coastal politicians’ and civil society’s attempts to clarify the issues. The fact that the MRC is arguably not the security threat we have been induced to believe does not obscure the real problems linked to the self-described social movement. These issues need to be addressed in a sober, systematic, and inclusive manner. But the discussion cannot take place as long as the press continues to follow the state’s lead in demonising the MRC. It appears that the English-language press has declared a propaganda war on the Coast, or at least a significant portion of the Coastal population, at a time when the theatre of constitutional reform is the real battleground. This is why it is time to call time-out and to re-assess the recent sequence of Coastal violence in relationship to the MRC agenda. It is also in the interest of mainstream media houses to park their spin-doctors, recall the fact checkers, and return to their tradition of balanced reportage. There are a number of examples of how unverified claims and innuendo have been used to sentence the MRC for crimes we do not know they committed. They include the disruption of the mock election exercise in Malindi, the commotion at the Mombasa law courts resulting in one death, the spurious claim that the MRC was planning to disrupt national examinations, the contradictory account of a non-attack on an AP post in Kilifi where the assailants conveniently dropped recruitment materials as they fled, and an assault on Kilifi MP Amason Kingi, who has defended the movement’s right to articulate Coastal grievances. Although the imputed association with the MRC is bereft of motive or convincing evidence, the latter incident occurring during a campaign rally instead provided the pretext for a fallacious narrative that quickly snowballed in the press. The combination of arrests, unsubstantiated inference, and misinformation encouraged many observers to presume the MRC is at the centre of a gathering super-storm of Coastal violence. Repeated claims associating the MRC with Al Shabaab and Islamist extremists are another red herring, contradicted by the fact the MRC Religious Council brings together Muslim imams and Christian preachers. Before the crackdown their jihad took the form of weekly meetings where they prayed for peace. Commentators who have verifiable evidence to the contrary should come forward to state their case — and not hide behind superficial comparisons to the Mungiki, condescending commentaries, or trivialising what are serious issues. The syndrome has generated some absurdly contradictory claims, like the theory that Arab tycoons are funding the MRC, and that the movement is a front for absentee Arab landlords. The MRC has promoted a surprising degree of unity between the Miji Kenda and the Arab-Swahili communities while refusing to engage with established politicians, which is why some view the MRC as a menace to their personal interests. The movement’s success exposes its own internal contradictions. The leadership’s emphasis on legal methodologies is at odds with its tumechoka na ahadi (we’re tired of empty promises) rejection of the pathways provided by the new Constitution. They cite the Coastal region’s inert political status quo as the root cause of their lower case status but their call to boycott elections is polarising their base. The MRC leadership is also responsible for some of the confusion over unproven allegations. While they vehemently rejected imputed links to several of the incidents before the latest arrests, their failure to develop an effective communications strategy affirming their commitment to non-violence made it easy for actors operating behind the scenes to scapegoat MRC leaders. Media pundits have nevertheless ignored both the MRC’s and more mainstream Coastal voices. Like the analyses two progressive Mombasa leaders published in Daily Nation, the question posed by Father Gabriel Dolan in his Saturday Nation column of October 28 awaits editorial consideration: “Why would an entity that remained non-violent during the ‘armed gangs’ ban go on the attack after it was lifted?” In the absence of evidence-based journalism, other motives for not responding to this query, like discrediting the Mutunga judiciary, spring to mind. Frequent repetition is a common technique used to make people believe in falsehoods, and this is especially effective in circumstances where familiar trends and models are not easily distinguished from the truth. In the case of Kenya’s Coast, this distinction is fuelling two conflicting narratives: One based on real and perceived injustices; the other based on flawed information and prejudiced reportage about the MRC’s political profile and activities. The former recognises why the MRC enjoys broad support across much of the rural and urban population, and acknowledges that many members of the Coastal intelligentsia and middle class are sympathisers despite their scepticism about Coastal self-rule. Most parties on the ground understand that the Pwani si Kenya slogan is more a cry for inclusion than a threat of secession, and that it went viral due to a combination of state persecution and the Coast’s endemic social exclusion. A scholar at Pwani University interprets the MRC campaign as a direct attack on the hegemonic narrative underpinning the Coast’s marginalisation. The counter-narrative encompasses a diverse range of issues being debated in the Swahili press, radio programmes, blogs, and social media — including refutations of arguments raised by the MRC. Does the re-awakening emerging across the previously docile Coastal street indicate the beginning of a Swahili Spring? It’s hard to say, but the corrective is long overdue. Attempts to mask or misrepresent the Swahili language discourse spreading across the Coast cannot be sustained in the presence of digital communication. This is not the first time secession has surfaced in Kenya and the region’s political arena. Zanzibar’s Uamsho movement is a more potent Islamist variation on the theme, and there are 11 other separatist campaigns active across the continent. Such stratagems are not unique to Africa: Spain is coping with Basque and Catalonian separatists, Quebec wants out of Canada, and after decades of lobbying, the Scots will decide their UK status in a 2014 referendum. Considering the formidable challenges facing Kenya’s security establishment during the run-up to national elections, the mix of media distortion and state repression of Coastal voices represents an unnecessary distraction from the real problem. *Paul Goldsmith is a researcher based in Meru, Kenya. Source: AfricaNewsUpdate