The Port of Mombasa has handled a total container throughput of 2.11 million TEUs in 2025, against 2 million TEUs in 2024, reflecting a 5.5 per cent increase. The port has also handled a record 45.45 million metric tonnes of cargo for the period January to December 2025. This is a 10 per cent increase, or 4.46 million metric tonnes, in comparison to 2024 when the port handled 41 million metric tonnes.
Dar es Salaam Bureau
5/11/26
If there is one major lesson from the Dangote, Tanga, and Mombasa refinery story, it is this: a serious investor does not fear taxes alone. He does not fear distance alone. He does not fear politics alone. What he fears most is a country that becomes unpredictable after his money is already buried in the ground.
Let us begin with what has been reported, not street gossip. Reuters reported that on April 23, 2026, President William Ruto said East African countries were discussing a joint refinery project at the port of Tanga, Tanzania. The proposed project was expected to mirror Dangote’s giant refinery in Nigeria, and Aliko Dangote himself indicated that he could lead the construction of a 650,000 barrels-per-day refinery if regional governments provided enough support. He also suggested that such a project could be built within four to five years once agreements were reached.
But shortly afterward, Reuters reported again that Dangote was now leaning more toward Mombasa, Kenya. His stated reason was simple: Mombasa has a larger and deeper port than Tanga. He also pointed to Kenya’s larger economy and higher fuel consumption. The proposed refinery has been estimated at around US$15 billion to US$17 billion. This is not a small project. It is a national, regional, and historic-scale investment.
In business language, Dangote did not insult Tanzania. He sent a message. And that message is heavier than many political speeches: logistics matter, but policy certainty matters even more.
That is why this discussion should not be reduced to the shallow question of whether Mombasa is deeper than Tanga. That is only part of the story. The bigger question is this: why would an investor like Dangote, who has already invested heavily in Tanzania, hesitate to place an even larger energy project in the same country?
That is where the ghost of Mtwara Cement returns.
Reuters reported in 2016 that Dangote Cement’s Mtwara plant cost around US$500 million and had capacity to produce about 3 million tonnes of cement per year. But the factory struggled with high energy costs because it was using expensive diesel generators. Dangote Cement needed government support to reduce production costs through natural gas. Talks with TPDC over gas pricing became difficult, with TPDC saying Dangote wanted gas at a very low “at-the-well” type price, while TPDC argued that it could not sell gas to a final consumer at that level because processing and transportation costs had to be included.
That alone explains the problem. When a major investor enters a project worth hundreds of millions of dollars, energy cannot remain an afterthought after construction is complete. Gas supply, gas pricing, price formula, transportation costs, connection timelines, backup fuel, and dispute mechanisms must be locked legally before the first concrete is poured.
Later, reports indicated that after a meeting with the late President John Magufuli, Tanzania and Dangote reached a natural gas supply arrangement. Magufuli blamed unnamed “middlemen” for interfering with the gas supply process and said Dangote would buy gas directly from TPDC at a reasonable price. But again, this exposed a deeper problem: a major investment dispute had to be solved by presidential intervention instead of a stable system that works by itself.
In 2017, Reuters reported that Tanzania granted Dangote Cement a coal mining licence at Ngaka after presidential direction. Reuters also reported that the factory had suspended production in December due to technical issues and high production costs, while relying on expensive diesel generators.
When you connect these facts, the picture is not small. Dangote did not face one isolated problem. He faced a system that could welcome him, promise him support, give him hope on land and energy, allow him to build, and then reopen critical issues after the investment had already been made. That is when a major investor quietly says: I have learned my lesson.
And that is Tanzania’s real lesson.
In mega investment, goodwill is not enough. Photos at State House are not enough. Political statements are not enough. An investor considering a US$15 billion to US$17 billion refinery needs certainty for 25 to 40 years. He needs to know that the port is ready, the land is clean, energy is available, the tax regime will not suddenly change, import rules will not be reversed by political mood, dispute resolution is clear, local content rules are predictable, and no shadowy middleman will appear after the deal is signed claiming to be the “real route.”
That is the difference between a country that attracts investors and a country that traps investors.
A US$500 million factory was built, it struggled with energy, gas pricing became a dispute, diesel generators became too expensive, production was suspended, the president had to intervene, middlemen were mentioned, and a coal licence was issued after presidential instruction.
That is not a strong investment ecosystem. That is a firefighting state,and a country cannot build an industrial economy through firefighting.
This is bigger than Dangote. It goes to the heart of Tanzania’s investment policy culture. From privatization to modern investment, Tanzania has often moved from one extreme to another. In the past, the state owned and ran almost everything, often with bureaucracy, inefficiency, and political interference. Later, the country rushed into privatization, but in many cases without strong contracts requiring production, technology upgrades, employment protection, or asset repossession if buyers deliberately killed factories.
The Citizen previously reported examples of privatized industries that collapsed or changed use. Some sale agreements reportedly lacked proper investment plans, termination clauses, or repossession protections if investors failed to fulfill obligations. Some factories stopped producing. Some machinery disappeared. Some industrial assets became warehouses or were stripped for scrap.
That is the same disease in a different form. Privatization without enforceable industrial covenants kills factories. New investment without policy stability scares investors. The result is a country with resources, ports, gas, land, young people, and access to regional markets, but still unable to confidently host mega projects because the system does not inspire enough trust.
That is why I say Mombasa is not just a port. Mombasa is a commercial signal. Dangote is looking at port depth, but he is also looking at the depth of the system. He is looking at Kenya’s market size, but also at the size of political and regulatory risk. He is looking at fuel consumption, but also remembering Mtwara.
Capital has memory.
When you hurt an investor after he has already invested, you may flatter him later, but he will return with a calculator of pain. He will ask: “If I build a US$17 billion refinery, who guarantees crude supply? Who guarantees port rights? Who guarantees tariff stability? Who guarantees that I will not be trapped between ministries, port authorities, land offices, energy regulators, tax officials, local authorities, and middlemen?”
That is where Tanzania risks losing before the fight even begins.
Kenya is not paradise. Kenya has corruption, political drama, bureaucracy, and its own investment risks. But when two countries compete for a mega project, patriotism does not decide the winner. Bankability does. Where can the project reach financial close more easily? Where is the port more ready? Where is the market pull stronger? Where is the political champion clearer? Where is the risk of post-investment rule change lower?
That is where Tanga may lose, not because it lacks value, but because Tanzania has not built enough reputation for protecting major investment promises.
For now, this is a strategic embarrassment. It does not have to be the end of the story, but it is a major alarm. Tanga may still have a chance. Tanzania may still have a case. But Tanzania’s case will not win by saying, We have a port. It will win by proving, We have a predictable system.
That is what our leaders often refuse to hear: a major investor does not have to hate you in order to leave you. He can praise you in public and invest next door in silence.
And that is what hurts here.
Dangote did not say Tanzania is bad. He did not hold a press conference attacking us. He simply said, in business language, that he is leaning toward Mombasa because of the port, the economy, and fuel consumption. But behind that sentence sits the long memory of Mtwara: gas, diesel, coal, middlemen, presidential intervention, and policy instability.
If Tanzania wants to learn, the lesson is clear: the world of mega investment is not moved by patriotic speeches. It is moved by institutional trust.
So the real question is not whether Dangote has abandoned Tanga. The bigger question is whether Tanzania has built a system capable of carrying Dangote.
And for now, unfortunately, the answer appears to be: not yet.
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