There is a crude challenge to someone engaged in protracted decision wrestling, but it employs language not appropriate for sophisticated essays. Such would be applicable to President Obama’s struggle over Middle East strategy.
Nevertheless, perhaps this is the best Obama can do. His 15-minute, address on Sept. 10 was as uncertain a trumpet as a president has sounded when taking the United States to war. We did not see a “warrior” emerge from the closet, but rather a bewildered president beset by a metastatic foreign policy cancer that he thought had been excised.
There was a tinge of grab-bag, “try everything; maybe something will work.”
• Support the (good) Syrian rebels (but not the bad Assad regime);
• Support the new Iraqi government while the old players remain on the scene waiting to re-emerge;
• Send more trainers/intelligence specialists/weapons experts to bolster Iraqi regular forces, while insisting there will be no combat boots on the ground. Amazing disconnect of priorities when media reports Washington will send 3,000 troops to combat the Ebola outbreak;
• Conciliate the assorted Iraqi Shia militias who say they won’t fight if U.S. combat forces are involved. Somehow reassure disaffected Sunnis and pry them away from supporting Islamic militants;
• Support Kurdish forces (perhaps the only effective anti-ISIS force in the region) while trying to reassure Turks that we don’t endorse an independent “Kurdistan.” Turkey, however, remains so skittish about saying “boo” to terrorists, it won’t even permit airstrikes from its bases. One wonders what secret arrangements Turkey made to release its diplomats/citizens ISIS held hostage;
• Rally “allies” from regional Arab states. Thus far verbal/financial support but no intimation of “troops on the ground” assistance;
• Generate NATO support.
• Somehow encourage Iran to fight ISIS (while refusing to deal with Tehran). Not invited to the Sept. 15 discussions in Paris, Iranian mullahs sneer at current plans.
[ David Kilgour: ISIS must be confronted with care, to not do more damage ]
Then there is the question of bombing – where, who, how much? Thus far we have touted approximately 200 aircraft and drone strikes against ISIS trucks, artillery pieces, and combat positions, but not until Sept. 22 did any Arab states participate. It is grimly amusing that for the most part we destroyed USG material ISIS captured from fleeing Iraqi forces. These strikes don’t even qualify as pinpricks – more akin to assassinations than combat strikes. In comparison, Coalition forces mounted 100,000 sorties against Iraqi forces prior to 1991’s Desert Storm.
Intensively bombing ISIS elements in Syria is a “must do.” ISIS cannot be accorded a sanctuary, but Syria (also not invited to Paris) will claim violation of its sovereignty. Will Assad sit back and let “moderate” rebels and ISIS kill each other off, hoping the weakened winner will make killing easier for him?
And, oh yes, put Israel-Gaza on the backburner, praying the reloading break/truce will hold. And, equally, hope the chewing gum/string Afghan political construct doesn’t become undone.
This is not foreign policy “strategy.”
This is akin to buffoonery soap opera.
At least begin by resolving the nomenclature issue. Obama-USG-Administration call the Islamic terrorists “ISIL” (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). The majority of observers label them “ISIS” (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). The terrorists, however, claim they are the “Islamic State” and indeed a “caliphate.” Obama says they are neither “Islamic” nor a “state” (a technical political term). But unfortunately, they are indeed “Islamic.” Perhaps “ISIS IS ISlam” – twisted, vicious, and counter to mainstream Islam, but Islamic none the less. And whether they are a “state” per se is irrelevant: they control territory, exercise authority, operate a “government,” and are self-funding. They are probably more a state than significant numbers of UN members.
The blunt and brutal conclusion is that we are back to the “long war.” ISIS success has stimulated volunteers throughout the globe; its combat forces may now be as high as 30,000. Opponents cannot count on it imploding. With money and fanatics eager to suicide, it is only a matter of time before ISIS seeks to behead Western opponents not retail with video-recorded U-Tube decapitations, but wholesale with bombings, anthrax poisoning, chemical weapons, or even “dirty” bombs.
We should have learned by now that half measures don’t work. Major combat forces both local and expeditionary are necessary. Bystanders and coat holders are distracting nonentities. It will be bloody and protracted – the consequence of not finishing the job the first time.
(Photo courtesy of Reuters)
David T. Jones is a retired State Department Senior Foreign Service Career Officer who has published several hundred books, articles, columns, and reviews on U.S. - Canadian bilateral issues and general foreign policy. During a career that spanned over 30 years, he concentrated on politico-military issues, serving as advisor for two Army Chiefs of Staff. He has just publishedAlternative North Americas: What Canada and the United States Can Learn from Each Other.
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